康德哲学两种区分模式中的两种逻辑谓词——兼评国内康德学界对两种逻辑谓词的三种理解  

On the Two Logical Predicates in the Two Modes of Distinction in Kant's Philosophy--A Review of Three Understandings of the Two Logical Predicates in Domestic Kantian Academia

作　　者：舒远招 Shu Yuanzhao

机构地区：[1]湖南大学岳麓书院哲学系

出　　处：《天津社会科学》2025年第1期51-63,174,175,共15页Tianjin Social Sciences

基　　金：湖南省社会科学基金一般项目“康德哲学中逻辑谓词与实在谓词难题及其解读模式研究”(项目号:22YBA023)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：康德哲学中有两种不同意义的逻辑谓词:一是康德在《逻辑学》中所说的分析命题仅仅包含的“逻辑谓词”(如物体概念所包含的“广延”),它与综合命题包含的“规定”(如物体概念未包含的“重量”)之间的区别是事物的内在规定与外在规定之分;二是康德在《纯粹理性批判》中反驳本体论证明时所说的仅仅在逻辑上被用作谓词的实存概念,它与“实在谓词”即“一个事物的规定”之间的区别是并非事物的谓词或规定的“模态”与事物的内在规定之分。在反驳本体论证明的特定语境中,实在谓词作为“一个事物的规定”特指上帝概念所包含的实在性(如“全能”),这是事物的内在规定,恰好处于分析命题所包含的“逻辑谓词”的层次之上,并不等同于综合命题所包含的“规定”。康德还把“上帝是(存在)”命题中的“是(存在)”与“上帝是全能的”这个分析命题的谓词概念“全能的”相区别,并认为“全能的”作为实在谓词是“一个关于某种能够加给一个事物的概念的东西的概念”。这两种不同意义的逻辑谓词,并不可以被理解为两种分析命题的谓词,或者被理解为同时与综合命题所包含的“规定”或“实在谓词”相对比的逻辑谓词,或者被理解为占据两种命题的谓词位置的概念。这三种理解都没有看到康德哲学中有两种关于逻辑谓词的区分模式,而且与综合命题包含的“规定”相对比的“逻辑谓词”,在与被当作逻辑谓词使用的模态概念的对比中,恰好就是康德所说的“实在谓词”,因而误将实在谓词等同于综合命题所包含的“规定”。它们都把“但规定却是一个加在主词概念之上并扩大主词概念的谓词”当作对实在谓词即“一个事物的规定”的界定,而没有看到这个说法是对“实存概念的一种精确规定”的说明,也没有看到“某种能够加给一个事�In Kant's philosophy,there are two kinds of logical predicates with different meanings.The first one is that the"logical predicate"(such as""extension"contained in the concept of object)contained in the analytic proposition mentioned in Logik,which is compared with the"determination"contained in the synthetic proposition(such as"weight"not contained in the concept of object),and the difference between the two is the distinction between the internal determination and external determination of things.The second one is that the concept of existence,which is used only logically as a predicate when refuting the ontological proof in Kritik der reinen Vernunft,which is compared with the"real predicate"or"determination of a thing",and the difference between the two is the distinction between the"modality"that is not the predicate or determination of a thing and the internal determination of a thing.In the specific context of refuting the ontological proof,the real predicate as"determination of a thing"specifically refers to the reality contained in the concept of God(such as"omnipotence"),which is the internal determination of things and just above the level of the"logical predicate"contained in the analytic proposition,and is not equivalent to the""determination"contained in the synthetic proposition.Kant also distinguishes the"is(being)"in the proposition"God is(being)"from the predicate concept"omnipotent"in the analytic proposition"God is omnipotent",and believes that"omnipotent"as a real predicate is"a concept about something that can be added to the concept of a thing"'.These two kinds of logical predicates with different meanings cannot be understood as the predicates of two analytic propositions,or as logical predicates that are simultaneously contrasted with the""determination"or"real predicates"contained in synthetic propositions,or as concepts that occupy the predicate position of two propositions,as some scholars believe.These three understandings fail to recognize that there are two modes of distinguishing l

关 键 词：逻辑谓词 实在谓词 规定 两种区分模式 分析命题 综合命题 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]