我思的双重向度——米歇尔·亨利对笛卡尔的诠释与批判  

Cogito's Double Dimension:Michel Henry's Interpretation and Critique of Descartes

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作  者:魏琴 WEI Qin

机构地区:[1]华中师范大学马克思主义学院

出  处:《北京社会科学》2025年第3期27-38,共12页Social Sciences of Beijing

基  金:国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(23FZXB067)——伽达默尔对诠释经验的现象学重建。

摘  要:米歇尔·亨利对笛卡尔的经典哲学命题“我思故我在”进行了新的诠释,从现象学的维度重新肯定了“我思”作为“哲学之开端”的合法性地位,强调“我思”具有一种原初的自身显现和自身感发性质。亨利拒斥胡塞尔、海德格尔等经典现象学家对“我思”的意向性、明见性解读,认为他们忽视了笛卡尔“我思”的激进内在性,强调后者实际上无法在绽出性的、对象性的直观之中被看见。亨利对笛卡尔本人的思想也进行了批判,认为他没能很好地区分“我思”的双重向度,即“我思”不仅具有一种使事物得以显现的“现象化功能”,同时还具有一种质料性的、不可见的“感受性”。亨利在笛卡尔研究和现象学研究两个方面都做出了原创性的贡献,其“质料现象学”不仅对笛卡尔的思想进行了重建和补充,还将现象学推进到了比胡塞尔和海德格尔等人更为激进的层次。Michel Henry provided a novel interpretation of Descartes classic philosophical proposition,‘cogito ergo sum’,reaffirming the legitimacy of‘cogito’as the‘beginning of Philosophy’from a phenomenological perspective.He emphasized that‘cogito’possesses an original self-manifestation and self-affectivity.Henry rejected the intentional and evidential interpretations of‘cogito’put forth by classical phenomenologists such as Husserl and Heidegger,contending that they overlooked the radical immanence inherent in Descartes assertion,which cannot be adequately captured within Ek-stasis or objective intuition.Furthermore,Henry critiqued Descartes own ideas,arguing that Descartes failed to effectively distinguish between the dual dimensions of‘cogito’.Specifically,Henry posited that‘cogito’encompasses not only a function of phenomenalization that brings things into manifestation,but also embodies a material and invisible affectivity.Henry made significant contributions to both Cartesian thought and Phenomenology.His work,‘Material Phenomenology’,not only reconstructs and supplements Descartes ideas,but also advances Phenomenology itself to a more radical level than those proposed by Husserl and Heidegger.

关 键 词:米歇尔·亨利 笛卡尔 我思 内在性 质料现象学 

分 类 号:B565.5[哲学宗教—外国哲学]

 

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