基于代理问题的报酬激励制度  

Agency Cost and Compen sation Contract

作　　者：刘燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《财经论丛（浙江财经学院学报）》2003年第2期79-84,共6页

摘　　要：现代企业制度的“两权分离” ,导致了企业的代理问题 ,如何实现企业经营者(代理人 )与股东 (委托人 )利益一致 ,激励相容 ,是解决代理问题的关键。本文论述了代理问题的类型、企业经营者长短期行为的报酬激励方式与特点 ,说明如何通过报酬制度的设定对经营者行为进行约束 ,协调代理人与委托人的利益冲突 ,降低代理成本。The characteristic of “the separation of ownership and control” inh ered in the institution of modern enterp rise has led to the organizational defe ct:agency problem.How to coordinate the interests between the clients and the ag ent is the key to solving the agency pro bl em.This paper discusses the kinds of age ncy problems and different styles of inc entive and compensation to short-term an d long-term behaviors of agent.Thus the paper indicates how to decrease the agen cy cost by setting incentive mech anism,and coordinating the contradiction s between managers and owners.

关 键 词：代理 报酬激励制度 企业 激励机制 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F275.4[经济管理—国民经济]