经营者股权激励的治理效应研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

The Research on Governance Effect of Top-management Stock Incentive——Empirical Evidences from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：周建波[1] 孙菊生[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计学院,200083 [2]江西财经大学会计学院,330013

出　　处：《经济研究》2003年第5期74-82,共9页Economic Research Journal

摘　　要：本文运用我国上市公司的经验证据来考察公司治理特征、经营者股权激励与公司经营业绩提高的关系。研究结果表明 :(1 )实行股权激励的公司 ,在实行股权激励前业绩普遍较高 ,存在选择性偏见。 (2 )经营者因股权激励增加的持股数与由第一大股东选派的董事比例显著正相关。董事长和总经理由同一人兼任的公司 ,经营者因股权激励增加的持股数显著高于两职分离的公司。 (3 )成长性较高的公司 ,公司经营业绩的提高与经营者因股权激励增加的持股数显著正相关。 (4)强制经营者持股、用年薪购买流通股以及混合模式的激励效果较好。我们的研究结果还表明 ,对于那些内部治理机制弱化的公司 ,经营者存在利用股权激励机制为自己谋利掠夺股东利益的行为 ;成立相对独立的薪酬与考核委员会等类似机构作为股权激励的实施主体是重要的。In this paper,we examine the relation between corporate governance ,executive managers stock incentive and enhancement of corporate performance . We find: Firstly, There exists selection bias, for adopting stock incentive companies whose performances are high before adopting stock incentive plan. Secondly, the coefficient between increasing shares of top-management and the ratio of directors who serve on the largest shareholder is positive and significant.Thirdly, as for companies with high growth opportunity, the coefficient between improvements in firm performance and increasing shares of top-management is positive and significant. Fourthly, incentive effect of obliging top-management share, buying negotiable shares with salary and mixing model are better.

关 键 词：上市公司 企业经营者 股权激励 治理效应 中国 流通股 激励机制 薪酬 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]