股票期权激励机制的缺陷分析及对策——从美国会计丑闻谈起  

Gap Analysis and Counter-measure of Stock Option as an Incentive Mechanism——Starting from Accounting Scandal in the United States

作　　者：张敏聪[1] 伍志强[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济学系,广东广州510632

出　　处：《华侨大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2003年第2期38-41,共4页Journal of Huaqiao University(Philosophy & Social Sciences)

摘　　要：股票期权是西方国家中盛行的一种激励机制。但近年来美国上市公司中所爆发的一系列造假事件,使人们对其产生了一定的怀疑。深入分析其原因及提出有关对策,有助于股票期权激励机制的完善。Stock option is an incentive mechanism prevailing among listed companies in the United States. However, the events of cook accounts erupting among U. S. listed companies raise the doubts of people on it. To analyse in-depth its causes and to advance relevant countermeasures will be conducive to perfecting incentive system of stock option.

关 键 词：会计 股票期权 激励机制 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]