奎因整体主义的经验心理学倾向  

The Empirical Psychological Tendencies of Quinn Holism

作　　者：刘萍 

机构地区：[1]江苏师范大学马克思主义学院,江苏 徐州

出　　处：《哲学进展》2024年第11期3135-3142,共8页Advances in Philosophy

摘　　要：从以往对奎因整体主义的研究来看,人们往往侧重于梳理“还原论”和“基础论”的思想。然而,对理论渊源的梳理还不足以突出整体主义的特征,还应对奎因思想前提中与个人认知取向相关的哲学语义学观点进行分析。本文从两个层面分析奎因整体主义:一是本体论层面,二是认识论层面。无论是从本体论还是认识论层面,奎因都没有对整体主义中“整体”的边界进行限定,而仅仅说明了整体主义对基础论和还原论的超越。由此看来,与其将奎因整体主义视为“获得关于外部世界知识”的系统理论,毋宁视为具有“经验心理学”特征的一种取向。奎因哲学思想体系庞杂,研究该思想取向有利于推动奎因总体哲学思想脉络的明晰与疑难问题的解决。From the previous study of Quinn holism, people often focus on combing the thoughts of “reductionism” and “fundamentalism”. However, the combing of theoretical origins cannot fully highlight the characteristics of holism, which also requires analyses of the philosophical semantics related to personal cognitive orientation in the premise of Quinn’s thought. This paper analyzes Quinn holism from two levels: one is ontological level, the other is epistemological level. Whether ontological or epistemological, Quinn does not define the boundary of “whole” in holism, but only explains the holism’s transcendence of foundationalism and reductionism. Instead of treating Quinn’s holism as a systematic theory of “acquiring knowledge about the external world”, it is rather an orientation characteristic of “empirical psychology”. Quinn’s philosophical ideological system is complex, and the study of this ideological orientation is conducive to promoting the clarity of Quinn’s overall philosophical thought context.

关 键 词：整体主义 还原论 基础论 经验心理学 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]