CEO继任与审计意见购买:“自利”与“利他”逻辑下的不同趋势  

CEO Succession and Audit Opinion Shopping: Different Trends under the Logic of “Self Interest” and “Altruism”

作　　者：胡佳月 吴炯[1] 

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海

出　　处：《国际会计前沿》2023年第4期478-489,共12页Frontiers of International Accounting

摘　　要：以2004~2021年沪深两市的A股上市公司为样本,运用Lennox审计意见购买模型,从自利和利他维度出发,考察CEO继任对企业审计意见购买的影响。研究表明,CEO继任后主要表现为利他主义,企业审计意见购买行为随着继任CEO任期的增加而减少。机制检验发现,CEO继任后通过“盈余管理”渠道进行审计意见购买。进一步分析发现,审计意见购买在继任CEO业绩压力较小、企业面临的亏损较大、企业财务重述可能性高时会被抑制。Taking A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2004 to 2021 as samples, using the Lennox audit opinion shopping model, this study examines the impact of CEO succession on corporate audit opinion shopping from the perspectives of self-interest and altruism. Research has shown that the main manifestation of CEO succession is altruism, and corporate audit opinion shopping behavior decreases with the increasing tenure of the succeeding CEO. Mechanism testing found that after CEO succession, audit opinions were purchased through the “earnings management” channel. Further analysis found that the purchase of audit opinions is suppressed when the performance pressure of the successor CEO is low, the company faces significant losses, and the possibility of financial restatement is high.

关 键 词：CEO继任 审计意见购买 盈余管理 自利 利他 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]