委托代理关系下团队激励机制的优化设计  

Optimal Design of Team Incentive Mechanism Based on Principal-Agent Theory

作　　者：王艳梅[1] 赵希男[1] 王高楠[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004 [2]清华大学机械工程学院,北京100084

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第7期1043-1045,共3页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：教育部博士点新教师基金资助项目(200801451043)

摘　　要：在委托代理的框架下,通过构建一个n人团队的委托代理模型研究团队激励机制的优化问题.通过对模型求解,得到影响团队成员激励的因素,并进一步分析了成员能力、风险态度以及团队化程度对员工相对激励强度的影响.研究结果表明,成员间的相对激励强度同时受成员能力、风险态度以及该团队的团队化程度共同决定;成员能力越强、风险规避度越小,该成员的相对激励强度就越大;另外,团队化程度较高时管理者应该弱化成员之间的激励差异.Based on the principal-agent theory, a relevant model was developed for a team to study the optimization of team incentive mechanism, where the team included a principal and n agents. Solving the model to acquire the influencing factor on incentive to the members of the team, how the competence, attitude toward risks and team spirits of a team member, as the influencing factors, affect the incentive to him/her was discussed. The results showed that the relative incentive intensity or motive force among those members is decided jointly by the three factors as above. The higher the competence of a member, the lower the risk he/she will run and the stronger the motive force to push him/her. Moreover, the manager shall minimize the incentive gap between different members if the team spirit is high as a whole.

关 键 词：团队 委托代理 激励机制 团队化程度 相对激励强度 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]