中国国有控股上市公司高管薪酬激励与盈余管理  

Study on the Top-managerial Compensation Incentives and Earnings Management of Chinese State-owned Listed Companies

作　　者：周晖[1] 马瑞[1] 朱久华[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082 [2]蒙纳士大学商业与经济学院

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2010年第4期48-52,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(07AJL005)

摘　　要：以中国国有控股上市公司为样本,从盈余管理对高管薪酬及其薪酬业绩敏感性的影响两方面,研究高管薪酬激励与盈余管理的关系,实证检验表明在调高操控性应计利润情况下,盈余管理程度分别与管理者的年度报酬水平和股权激励呈正相关关系,另外,盈余管理对薪酬业债敏感性也有正向影响,据此提出了有效控制盈余管理行为的政策建议。By obtaining a sample of Chinese state-owned listed companies,this paper studies the relationship between top-managerial compensation and earning management from the impact of earning management on top-managerial compensation and sensitivity of performance-related compensation.The empirical examination finds that,in the case of the discretionary total accruals adjusted to increase reported earnings,there is a significant positive correlation between executive annual pay and earnings management,earnings management is positively related to top-managerial share incentives,in addition,earnings management has positive effect on sensitivity of performance-related compensation.Based on that,we put forward a series of suggestions to control earnings management effectively in the end.

关 键 词：年度报酬 股权激励 薪酬业绩敏感性 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]