薪酬管制降低了经理人的激励效率吗?——基于迎合效应的薪酬结构模型分析  

Does Wage Restraint Reduce Manager's Incentive Efficiency? An Analysis of Model of Pay-structure Based on Catering Theory

作　　者：陈菊花[1] 隋姗姗[1] 王建将[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《南方经济》2011年第10期38-46,80,共10页South China Journal of Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金项目的预研课题(9214000507)的资助

摘　　要：薪酬管制是我国市场低效率和政府作为国有企业经营者的特殊身份下的现实选择,而市场低效率集中体现在投资者非理性,薪酬管制给经理人通过迎合投资者情绪获取私人收益创造了客观条件。本文基于迎合效应的薪酬结构模型分析,将在职消费纳入薪酬契约中,探讨薪酬管制前后怎样的薪酬结构会致使国有企业经理人为了自身利益最大化而做出迎合投资者情绪的投资决策。研究表明,薪酬管制并没有如现有文献所诟病的那样降低了经理人的激励效率,在制度创新尚未成熟前,在职消费与限制性股票的契约组合反而成为经理人自我激励的方法。这说明在低效率市场中薪酬管制有其合理性。Wage restraint is a practical choice against the background of lower economic efficiency and the government as state-owned enterprise operator. Low economic efficiency mainly reflected in investor＇ s irrationality. Wage Restraint created a condition for manager to cater to investor sentiment. In this paper, we analyze the model of Pay-structure based on the catering theory and take non-pecuniary compensation into account. Comparing the efficiency before and after wage restraint, we discuss what kind of salary structure would lead managers of state-owned enterprises to cater to investor sentiment in order to maximize their own interests. The study found that wage restraint does not reduce the manager＇ s incentive efficiency. The combinations of non-pecuniary compensation and restricted stock can become a self-motivated approach before the system innovation is not yet mature.

关 键 词：投资者情绪 薪酬管制 在职消费 薪酬结构 

分 类 号：F270-05[经济管理—企业管理]