机构投资者与高管薪酬——中国上市公司研究  

Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation——A Study on Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：毛磊[1] 王宗军[1] 王玲玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074

出　　处：《管理科学》2011年第5期99-110,共12页Journal of Management Science

摘　　要：以中国上市公司为研究对象,利用面板数据模型研究中国机构投资者持股对上市公司高管薪酬的影响,从高管薪酬水平和薪酬业绩敏感度两个方面考察机构投资者整体以及包括基金、券商、QFII、社保基金、保险公司和信托公司在内的不同类型机构投资者对高管薪酬影响的差异性,基于2005年至2009年沪深两市874家上市公司样本进行实证。研究结果表明,机构投资者整体对高管薪酬存在显著的影响,即机构投资者持股有效地提高了高管薪酬水平和薪酬业绩敏感度;不同机构投资者对高管薪酬的影响存在很大的差异性,其中只有基金对高管薪酬水平和薪酬业绩敏感度表现出显著影响,而QFII、券商、社保基金、保险公司和信托公司对高管薪酬水平和薪酬业绩敏感度不存在影响或影响不显著。The paper uses panel data model to study the influences of institutional ownership on executive compensation based on Chinese listed companies,focusing on research different influences of different institutional investors on executive compensation,including all institutional investors,funds companies,securities companies,QFII,social security funds,insurance companies and trust companies.Based on the empirical research of 874 listed companies′ samples in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange markets over the 5 years period 2005 to 2009,the paper finds that： all institutional investors have played an important role in promoting executive compensation and pay performance sensitivity;and different institutional investors have the different influences on executive compensation,only funds ownership is positively related to executive compensation and pay performance sensitivity,while securities companies,QFII,social security funds,insurance companies and trust companies have no significant relationship.

关 键 词：机构投资者 高管薪酬 薪酬水平 薪酬业绩敏感度 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]