薪酬激励与管理者过度自信——基于薪酬行为观的研究  

Executive Compensation and Managerial Overconfidence:Study from the Angle of Compensation-based Behavioral View

作　　者：文芳[1] 汤四新[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院现代公司理财研究所,广东广州510521

出　　处：《财经研究》2012年第9期48-58,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(12YJA630142);广东省自然科学基金项目(S2011040001881)

摘　　要：行为是制度与绩效的中介,由于忽视了薪酬对参与者心理和行为的影响,传统代理理论框架下薪酬合约的激励效果是不明确的。文章实证检验了薪酬激励对管理者自信程度的作用。研究发现,薪酬(无论薪酬水平还是薪酬差距)是管理者自信程度的重要影响因素。与非国有上市公司相比,在国有上市公司中薪酬激励对管理者自信程度的正向促进作用更为显著;公司所在地市场化进程较高时,薪酬激励对管理者自信程度也具有更为显著的正向促进作用。Behavior is the intermediary between institution and perform ance. Owing to a neglect of the effect of compensation on participants psy chology and behavior, the incentive effects of compensation contracts under traditional agency theory framework are ambiguous. This paper empirically studies the effect of executive compensation on managerial confidence. It shows that executive compensation, whether compensation level or compen sation gap between managers, is an important factor influencing managerial confidence. Compared with nonstateowned listed companies, executive compensation in stateowned listed companies has a more significantly posi tive effect on managerial confidence; higher degree of marketization in the company location leads to a more significantly positive effect of executive compensation on managerial confidence.

关 键 词：薪酬水平 薪酬差距 管理者信心 产权性质 市场化进程 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]