真谓词的一个新模式  

A New Scheme for the Truth Predicate

作　　者：熊明[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学政治与行政学院

出　　处：《哲学研究》2013年第6期111-118,129,共8页Philosophical Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目"哲学逻辑视角下的真理论研究"(编号10CZX036);广东省优秀青年创新人才培育项目(育苗工程项目)(编号WYM08064)研究成果

摘　　要：受哥德尔不完全性定理的启示，塔斯基提出了著名的算术真之不可定义性定理（常称为“塔斯基定理”）：任何一个形式语言，如果它丰富到足以包含算术，那么就不可能包含这样一个谓词T，使得模式“T“A”，当且仅当A”对这个语言中的任何语句A都成立。In both Tarski's and Kripke's theories of truth,the principle being used to define the truth predicate is not Tarski's T-scheme(i.e.,T ' A ' iff A),but the similar schemes that are involved in certain possible worlds.On the basis of these schemes,we generalize a new scheme for the truth predicate;for any possible worlds u and v,if v is accessible from u,then T' A' holds at v,iff.A holds at u.According to this scheme,the truth predicate of a language can be defined within this language itself even the evaluation of sentences is classical.Furthermore,this scheme is more compatible than Tarski's T-scheme:by use of the new scheme,we can not only reveal the common characteristics of all the paradoxes,but also determine their own semantic conditions under which they lead to a contradiction.

关 键 词：哥德尔不完全性定理 谓词 形式语言 不可定义 塔斯基 算术 语句 

分 类 号：B712.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]