道德先天性及其在经验知识层面的展开——孟子“良知”理论的内在逻辑  

The Congenital Moral and Its Performance in Experience and Knowledge World——The Internal Logic of Mencius “Liangzhi” Theory

作　　者：陆畅[1] 白欲晓[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学哲学系,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《南昌大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2014年第4期17-22,共6页Journal of Nanchang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"儒教的传统形态与现代转型研究"(11BZJ038);江苏省高校哲学社会科学重点研究基地"南京大学儒佛道与中国传统文化研究中心"重大项目"儒学概念;问题与价值综合研究"(2010JDXM008)

摘　　要：孟子"良知"之"良"本义为"首",它显现的是道德超越性而非经验性,经验知识在时间上先行存在,并不意味着可以否定良知所具有的先天性、超越性。良知的道德超越性,是指独立于经验世界不为其干扰限制。同时良知又具有内在性,它既独立于经验又行于经验之中,表现于事事物物。在孟子那里,一个完满的道德应当是良知的超越性与经验内容相结合的既内在又超越的模式。＂Hang＂ in the word ＂Liangzhi＂ means ＂First＂, which is not the first position in the time sequence. Experience and knowledge is the first in time than other things, but that does not mean Liangzhi as an important concept in the thought of Confucianism. The so called congenital does not mean starting time sequence, but in de pendent of experience. Also, Liangzhi shows itself in the experience. Each moral behavior is synthetic a priori propo sition which is combined by Liangzhi and knowledge.

关 键 词：孟子 良知 道德先天性 经验知识 无限性 有限性 内在超越 

分 类 号：B222.5[哲学宗教—中国哲学]