法律论证的优先性正义标准研究  

A Study on Precedent Justice in Legal Argumentation

作　　者：冉杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]广州大学政治与公民教育学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《深圳大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2014年第5期76-84,共9页Journal of Shenzhen University：Humanities & Social Sciences

摘　　要：协调不能并存或不应该并存的利益关系的正义可被称为优先性正义。目前,解决优先性正义标准问题的路径主要有两条。其一是以人性为依据的理论路径。但是,以何种人性为依据,人们充满争议,而且合乎人性的未必是正确的,这使得这一理论路径难以实现其目的。其二是德性伦理理论路径。但是,它们以之为依据的善或善人,要么是不具有公共的正当性,要么是没有被清楚地界定,因而也不能满足法律论证的要求。基于此,依据共同善特别是人类的繁荣,德性法律论证理论试图建立起立法和司法论证的优先性正义标准。The justice which harmonizes interests relations that cannot or should not coexist concurrently can be called precedent justice. Currently there seems to be two approaches to establishing the criterion for precedent. The first is to base it on human nature, which gives rise to the self-defeating controversy of what constitutes or what kind of human nature. The second approach centers on virtue and ethics, but what constitutes virtue and virtuous persons seems either ill-defined or falling short of public legitimacy, thus unable to satisfy the requirement of legal argumentation either. In view of this, the common good, especially human prosperity, has been used to establish the standard of justice for legislation and legal argumentation.

关 键 词：法律论证 优先性正义 德性 共同善 

分 类 号：B82-061[哲学宗教—伦理学]