管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效  

Management Power,Executive Human Capital Incentive and Enterprise Performance

作　　者：朱焱[1] 翟会静 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410006

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2014年第6期96-102,共7页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：湖南省科技厅项目(2012FJ6028)

摘　　要：合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。Reasonable incentive mechanism of executive human capital is an effective way to promote the utility of human capital and improve enterprise performance.This article verifies the relationship among management power,executive human capital incentive and enterprise performance through empirical research.The empirical result shows that：there is a significantly positive correlation between executives monetary compensation and enterprise performance,the correlation for non-state-owned enterprises is more obvious when compared with state-owned enterprises.Management power has weakened the incentive effect of executives monetary compensation on enterprise performance.There is a significantly negative correlation between on-the-job consumption and enterprise performance in state-owned enterprises,but no significant correlation in non-state-owned enterprise;Management power has increased the negative impact of on-the-job consumption on enterprise performance.There is a significantly positive correlation between executive compensation gap and enterprise performance,the correlation for nonstate-owned enterprises,is more obvious when compared with state-owned enterprises;Management power weakened the incentive effect of pay gap within the executive team on enterprise performance.

关 键 词：货币薪酬 在职消费 薪酬差距 管理层权力 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]