管理层权利、交互效应与高管薪酬——来自中国上市民营企业的证据  

Managerial Power, Interactive Effects and Executive Compensation——The Evidence from Chinese Private Enterprices

作　　者：邓伟根[1] 薛莲[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学产业经济研究院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《经济与管理》2016年第2期66-71,共6页Economy and Management

摘　　要：在管理层权力假说框架下加入董事长与总经理二职分离变量等解释变量,通过对中国上市民营企业的研究发现,高管权利与高管薪酬正相关,此时高管薪酬的增加与股东收益无关。二职合一会增大高管权利,使得其他公司治理机制都无法起到有效的制衡作用,但其一定程度上使得资产结构回归正常;二职分离时,董事会对高管薪酬有制衡作用,然而更为有效的方式是加强监事会的功能发挥以及明确高管间权责。Combining ＂board chairman-general manager＂ duality with manager power hypothesis, this paper finds that in Chinese non-SOEs manager power is positive related with their compensation. Meanwhile, top managers＇ compensation is unrelated with shareholders＇ wealth. Though the duality will make other corporate governance mechanism useless,its bright side is to help asset structure becoming normal. When board chairman and general manager are different individuals, compensation will be supervised by board members. However, more efficient way is to give supervisors more power and clarify top managers＇ right and obligation.

关 键 词：薪酬业绩敏感性 管理层权力理论 薪酬制度 交互效应 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]