基于薪酬辩护论的垄断国企高管薪酬业绩敏感性研究  

Pay Performance Sensitivity of Top Management in Monopoly Industries Based on the Theory of Compensation Defense

作　　者：马强 

机构地区：[1]南通大学商学院,江苏南通226019

出　　处：《南通大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第6期103-110,共8页Journal of Nantong University:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(12YJA630087);江苏省"六大人才高峰"D类资助项目(2011-JY-002)

摘　　要：以国有垄断和完全竞争两类上市公司为对比样本,考量垄断国企高管薪酬制度的合理性有效性,通过实证研究发现:垄断国企高管薪酬与公司当期业绩存在显著正相关关系,国有垄断企业的薪酬业绩敏感度大于完全竞争企业,存在一定程度的激励过度问题;在相对业绩不同的样本组中,垄断国企样本组存在"薪酬—业绩敏感度"不对称的现象,相对业绩高的样本组中高管薪酬业绩敏感度显著为正,相对业绩较低样本组高管薪酬业绩不敏感。This article uses the payment data of top management from 2002 to 2010 in published companies to analyze the rationality of the payment system on executive level in monopoly industries.We find that the payment incentive in currency value for top management in monopoly industries is positively related to current company performance.In addition,in the sample groups of various performance levels,there is asymmetric phenomenon in which sensitivity degree of top management performance is positive in high performance sample group which the degree is negative in low performance sample group.

关 键 词：垄断国企 高管薪酬 薪酬业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F272.923[经济管理—企业管理]