业务分布、子公司多元化与上市公司高管薪酬激励  

Business Distribution,Subsidiaries′Diversification and Executive Compensation Incentive of Listed Companies

作　　者：马忠[1] 王龙丰 梁相[1] MA Zhong;WANG Longfeng;LIANG Xiang(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China)

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044

出　　处：《管理科学》2021年第2期98-113,共16页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(14BGL039);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2017YJS082)。

摘　　要：高管薪酬契约的制定受公司内外部因素的共同影响,已有关于高管薪酬决定机制的研究尚未关注公司内部业务结构性分布特征的影响。当上市公司的多元化经营业务向子公司层面布局时,会引起上市公司业绩来源的变化以及对高管才能需求的变化,这种变化如何影响上市公司高管薪酬激励有待深入探讨。从纵向维度的上市公司合并整体业务在母子公司之间分布和横向维度的子公司多元化两个角度,依据最优薪酬契约理论和基于高管才能竞争需求的薪酬市场配置理论,揭示上市公司内部业务结构特征对上市公司高管才能需求和对合并业绩中反映高管努力程度噪音的影响,及其进一步决定高管薪酬水平和薪酬业绩敏感性的内在机理。以2008年至2015年沪深A股上市公司为样本,采用手工整理的子公司行业和地域多元化等数据,运用多元回归分析等方法,对上述影响机制进行检验。研究结果表明,上市公司合并整体经营业务分布于子公司层面的比重越高,上市公司高管薪酬水平越高,薪酬业绩敏感性越低;当业务主要分布于子公司时,子公司行业多元化或者子公司地域多元化程度越高,上市公司高管薪酬水平和薪酬业绩敏感性也越高。在实施股权激励的公司中,分布于子公司的业务比重提升高管薪酬水平的效应会减弱,但降低薪酬业绩敏感性的效应会增强,并且子公司多元化提升高管薪酬水平和薪酬业绩敏感性的效应会减弱。研究结果从母子公司之间业绩来源的角度扩展了以公司业绩为基础的高管薪酬激励决定机制的理论解释,从业务结构性差异影响高管才能需求的角度扩展了高管薪酬水平决定机制的理论解释,丰富了高管薪酬激励影响因素的研究。对企业在授权经营模式下完善不同层级高管的差异化激励机制、选择有效激励参照基准和考核基准等方面具有重要的The executive compensation incentive is jointly affected by multiple factors within and outside of the firms.Few existing studies investigate the effect of firms′business distribution on the executive compensation incentive.When the diversified business of a listed company is expanding towards its subsidiaries,it will induce changes in revenue source and shift the demand for executive talen.How these changes in turn affect the executive compensation incentive of the listed companies need to be further explored.In view of this,from the vertical dimension of the listed companies merging the overall business and distributing them between parent and subsidiary companies,and the horizontal dimension of the diversification of the subsidiary companies,this study reveals the effect of internal business structure characteristics on the demand for executive talent and the noise of reflecting executive effort in consolidated performance.Based on the sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2015,this study uses the manual data of industry and regional diversification of subsidiaries and multiple regression analysis to test the above influence mechanism.The results suggest that:(1)When the proportion of the whole business in the subsidiary is high,the executive compensation level would be higher and the sensitivity of compensation-performance would be lower.(2)The degree of subsidiaries′industrial and geographical diversification is higher,the executive compensation level as well as the sensitivity of compensation-performance would be higher in the case that the business is mainly distributed in subsidiaries.(3)In the companies that implement equity incentive,with the increase of the proportion of business distributed in subsidiaries,the effect of executive compensation level will be weakend,but the negative effect on decreasing the sensitivity of compensation-performance would be intensified,and the positive effect of subsidiaries′diversification on improving executive compensation level

关 键 词：业务分布 行业多元化 地域多元化 薪酬水平 薪酬业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F272.923[经济管理—企业管理]