维特根斯坦“正确”概念的语义分析:认知、逻辑和言行  

A Semantic Analysis ofWittgenstein's Concept of"Right":Of Cognition,of Logic,ofWords and Deeds

作　　者：刘清平 Liu Qingping(Fudan University)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学社会科学高等研究院,上海200433 [2]武汉传媒学院人文学院

出　　处：《武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2022年第1期46-56,共11页Wuhan University Journal：Philosophy & Social Science

摘　　要：维特根斯坦在自己前后期的哲学思想中,从不同角度讨论了认知、逻辑和言行的“正确”问题。不过,他非但没有界定和辨析三种“正确”的不同含意,反倒经常将它们混为一谈,结果造成了某些理论上的混乱。其实,辨析三者之间在语义方面的微妙异同以及互动关联的关键,在于找到它们试图“符合”的不同标准:认知正确在于符合事实,逻辑正确在于符合法则,言行正确在于符合规范。In his early and later philosophies,Wittgenstein discusses the issue of the"right"of cognition,logic,words and deeds from different aspects.However,he does not strictly define or analyze the different senses of the three kinds of''right'',but often confuses them and thus results in some theoretical misunderstandings and distortions.From the perspective of philosophical analysis,the key to distinguishing the subtle similarities and differences and interactive relations among the three kinds of''right''lies in the identification of their specific standards to which they are required to conform,respectively.The cognitive rightness lies in the conformity to"facts",the logical rightness to"rules",and the rightness of words and deeds to"norms".

关 键 词：维特根斯坦 真 假 真理 认知 逻辑 言行 

分 类 号：B561.4[哲学宗教—外国哲学]