薪酬激励对于企业创新的影响——锦标赛理论还是委托代理理论?  

The Influence of Compensation Incentive on Firm Innovation:Tournament Theory or Principal-agent Theory?

作　　者：吕峻[1] Lü Jun(Institute of Quantitative and Technological Economics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100732,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究所,中国社会科学院项目评估与战略规划研究咨询中心,北京100732

出　　处：《技术经济》2023年第11期93-102,共10页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“建设人才强国背景下激发科技人员创新活力的研究”(21ZD014)。

摘　　要：薪酬激励对企业创新影响的理论当前主要有基于薪酬差距的锦标赛理论和基于管理层薪酬的委托代理理论。本文利用我国非金融类A股上市公司数据,将薪酬差距和管理层薪酬结合起来。研究发现,企业内部薪酬差距主要来自于管理层外部薪酬溢价,薪酬激励对创新产出的促进作用主要通过增加创新投入产生。无论从薪酬差距视角还是管理层薪酬视角,薪酬激励和企业创新之间的关系更加适合用委托代理理论而不是锦标赛理论解释。内部薪酬差距的扩大是否有利于企业创新尚需更加合理的数据和研究设计予以证实。The current theories on the impact of compensation incentive on enterprise innovation mainly include tournament theory based on pay gap and principal-agent theory based on management compensation.By using the data of China’s non-financial A-share listed companies,and combining the salary gap with the management salary,the internal salary gap is mainly caused by the high external salary premium of the management,and the promotion effect of pay incentive on innovation output is mainly generated through innovation investment.This empirical result is more suitable to be explained by principal-agent theory rather than tournament theory.Whether the widening of internal pay gap is conducive to enterprise innovation still needs more reasonable data and research design to confirm.

关 键 词：薪酬激励 薪酬差距 锦标赛理论 委托代理理论 高管激励 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]