当代中国哲学的情感主体理论——以李泽厚、蒙培元为中心  

The Dilemma of Emotion Subject Theory in Modern Chinese Philosophy——Focusing on Li Zehou and Meng Peiyuan

作　　者：郭萍 Guo Ping

机构地区：[1]山东大学儒家文明省部共建协同创新中心,济南250100

出　　处：《清华大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第2期155-167,238,共14页Journal of Tsinghua University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：以蒙培元、李泽厚为代表的当代中国学者认为,道德理性主体不仅存在压制情感的现实弊病,而且其本身就是一种缺乏实质内容的抽象概念,因而存在着脱离现实世界的本体论缺陷。为此,他们提出了各自的情感主体理论予以矫正。其中,李泽厚提出的“情本体”立足“历史人类学本体论”,确立了情理调配的经验性心理情感的本体地位;蒙培元构建的“情感儒学”以弘扬儒家道德价值的实存意义为目的,确立了寓理于情的先验性真情实感的本体地位。然而,这两个思想进路不同的情感主体理论仍然是一种主体哲学的论说,因此,无法有效摆脱主体哲学的普遍困限。尽管如此,蒙培元、李泽厚的情感主体理论蕴含的生存论意味也预示着新的理论可能,这正在成为当前中国哲学主体观念重建的一个方向。Li Zehou and Meng Peiyuan as representatives of Chinese scholars who criticized the rational subject not only suppressed emotional appeals and neglected the role of emotion in mind,but it did not include any content except abstract logic.Therefore,they both developed separate theories of emotion.Li Zehou's emotion ontology,based on his anthropological history ontology,is to establish an empiricist psychoemotional subject,and its reason is that sensual life is the foundation and purpose of human history.Meng Peiyuan' s emotion Confucianism,rooted in Confucian ideal of morality,is to construct a transcendental moral-emotional subject,because in this theory,moral rationality means the only priori grounds and the highest value.Both of the two theories have the dilemma of subjective philosophy.However,they contain a turning from logocentrism to existentialism,which has opened some new possibilities to reconstruct the subject theories of contemporary Chinese philosophy.

关 键 词：情感儒学 情本体 道德情感 心理情感 主体哲学 生存论 

分 类 号：B82-092[哲学宗教—伦理学] B26