团队人力资本视角下企业高管报酬契约和激励机制研究框架  

A New Research Framework with Team Human Capital Perspective on Rewards Contract and Incentive Mechanism Design for Enterprise Executives

作　　者：丁宏伟[1] 陈进[1] 张国民[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《上海理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第3期243-248,共6页Journal of University of Shanghai for Science and Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金资助项目(07JA630070);上海市教委科研创新基金资助项目(09YS231);上海市研究生创新基金资助项目(JWCXSL1022);上海理工大学人文社科基金资助项目(1F10303006)

摘　　要：针对高管个体的报酬契约和激励机制问题的研究,国内外学者已从不同角度进行了系统而深入的研讨。然而,基于团队视角特别是基于团队人力资本视角的相关研究尚不多见。现代企业契约理论认为,高管的人力资本投入应该参与企业剩余权的分配,并且,企业的决策和运营过程是组织内所有高层管理者的一种团队生产行为。以团队人力资本为视角对此问题展开研究有其必要性和现实意义。设计了以团队人力资本的定价和产权理论为基础,建立高管薪酬契约和激励机制的一个全新研究框架,为解决长期困扰企业(尤其是国有企业)的经营者激励问题提供理论借鉴。Up to now, scholars domestic and foreign have conducted a systematic in-depth study from different perspectives on the rewards contract and incentive mechanism of executives. However, research from the perspective of team, particularly of team human capital, is extremely rare. Modem enterprise contract theory holds that investment in human capital of executives should be involved in the distribution of residual right, and that corporate decision-making and operating processes are considered a team＇s productive behavior of all senior managers in the organization. Thus, it is highly necessary and significant to study this problem from the perspective of team human capital. In this paper, on the basis of pricing and property rights theory of team human capital, we establish a new research framework of executives＇ rewards contract and incentive mechanism, and provide a theoretical reference for enterprises （especially state-owned enterprises） to resolve the long-existing problem of operators＇ incentive.

关 键 词：团队人力资本 高管团队 报酬契约 激励机制 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]