胡塞尔与“笛卡尔主义”  

Husserl and Cartesianism

作　　者：马迎辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学哲学系

出　　处：《社会科学》2015年第7期119-127,共9页Journal of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"与胡塞尔共同思考超越论现象学:以时间构造为主导线索"(项目编号:12CZX048)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：在奠基性的纯粹意识、交互主体性和绝然明见性问题上,胡塞尔突破了笛卡尔的"我思"哲学的限度,复兴了哲学作为严格的自身负责的科学的理念,但由于他错失了笛卡尔在纯粹的清楚明白的知觉,以及作为这种知觉之基础的上帝存在观念的绝对被给予性这两个方面做出的创造性的贡献,从而错失了笛卡尔对现代哲学可能具有的建构作用。On the evidence, Husserl broke issues through of the founding pure consciousness, intersubjectivity and absolute the limit of Descartes＇ philosophy of ＂cogito＂, and revived the idea that philosophy as a strict science which is responsible for itself. But, due to his missing Descartes＇ creative contributions both in pure clear and distinct perception and in the absolute giveness of the idea of the Being of God, which is the foundation of the former, Husserl missed the constructive function which Descartes might make to modem philosophy.

关 键 词：我思 纯粹意识 明见性 知觉 被给予性 

分 类 号：B516.52[哲学宗教—外国哲学]