池水微澜:地区人才政策对高管薪酬契约的影响  

Casting the Ripple:The Impact of Local Talent Introduction Policies on Executive Compensation Contracts

作　　者：陈宁[1] 方军雄 Chen Ning;Fang Junxiong(School of Management,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China;School of Accounting,Zhejiang University of Finance&Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [2]浙江财经大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《外国经济与管理》2022年第11期93-107,共15页Foreign Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71872048)。

摘　　要：伴随着“天价薪酬”现象的出现,业绩型薪酬契约的弊端日益受到监管部门和学者的关注,经理人市场作为业绩型薪酬契约的替代机制再次引起了研究者的兴趣,本文以地方政府人才引进政策为契机考察经理人市场对微观企业高管薪酬契约的影响。研究发现,在地方政府发布和实施人才引进政策后,所在辖区企业的高管薪酬业绩敏感性随之明显下降。上述发现在一系列稳健检验中依然存在,包括改变业绩衡量指标、加入公司固定效应、调整政策发布时间、考虑时间趋势因素、加入城市宏观经济控制变量和删除一线城市样本。进一步分析发现,人才政策的实施使得企业更多地采取代理权变更的方式对高管进行激励约束,具体表现为高管变更业绩敏感性的提高。分组检验显示,以上结果在独董比例低、由非四大审计、分析师跟踪数少的样本中更为显著。上述研究表明,人才引进政策可以通过经理人市场机制对企业的业绩型薪酬契约制度产生替代作用,这不仅拓展了企业高管薪酬契约的影响因素文献,也有助于政策制定者更好地评价人才引进政策的经济后果。The debate on optimal contracting and managerial power hypotheses continues to rage on.Reeling from frequent extremely-high executive compensation payment,concerns have begun to emerge about the drawbacks of performance-based compensation contracts,whose defects are of great concern from both regulators and researchers.Therefore,those concerned gradually resort to other efficient governance mechanisms.Serving as an alternative mechanism in substituting performancebased compensation contracts,manager market scheme has increasingly gained scholars’attention.But for ages,owing to the low degree of marketization and scant chance of outside-hiring among stateowned firms and family firms,China’s manager market has undergone the development with a late start and slow step,which is even aggravated by the unbalanced regional economic development and labor market segmentation.We manually collect the release of talent introduction policies from 24 major cities in China,selecting non-financial A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as the research sample.We aim to explore the impact of talent introduction policies on pay-for-performance sensitivity among local firms and successfully find that pay-for-performance sensitivity significantly decreases following these policies.The above results are robust after using alternative performance measures,adding firm fixed effect,changing policy release definition,considering time trend effect,adding city-level macroeconomic control variables,and deleting tier-one city samples.In further analysis,we test the impact of policies on executive turnover-performance sensitivity,and find that the turnover threat scheme is the main channel the boards utilize under the manager market mechanism.The above results are more pronounced in firms with lower independent director percentage,non-Big 4 auditing and less analyst following.This paper clarifies that manager market can partially substitute the role performance-based executive compensation contracts play in monitoring and incentivizing

关 键 词：人才引进政策 经理人市场 高管薪酬契约 薪酬业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] C964.2[经济管理—人力资源管理]